AllFlag 0.1.2+3 now builds and signs successfully. The owner resolved the remaining store-authentication issue locally by changing the JKS store password and updating the private configuration. The upload certificate is unchanged. The agent did not modify the keystore or passwords. Earlier blocked attempts below are historical and superseded by this result.
| Check | Final result |
|---|---|
| flutter build appbundle –release | Passed |
| flutter build apk –release | Passed |
| APK apksigner verification | Passed; one signer, APK Signature Scheme v2 |
| AAB jarsigner verification | Passed: jar verified |
| AAB payload verification | All 85 non-META-INF payload entries cryptographically verified against the expected certificate |
| flutter analyze | No issues |
| flutter test | All 7 tests passed |
| Version / package | 0.1.2+3 / com.allflag.allflag |
Both artifacts use this exact upload certificate SHA-256:
9F:61:1A:BA:E6:AC:37:EF:F0:E4:A3:73:2F:7E:E7:90:8B:75:5C:45:2D:6D:9D:AE:71:BC:74:15:89:74:36:23
Final AAB: build/app/outputs/bundle/release/app-release.aab — 47,665,881 bytes (approximately 45.46 MiB). Final APK: build/app/outputs/flutter-apk/app-release.apk — 48,219,031 bytes (approximately 45.99 MiB). Both files exist.
jarsigner reports a self-signed certificate/untrusted public-CA chain, no timestamp, and unsigned ZIP permission/symlink attributes. These warnings are recorded separately from the successful cryptographic signature validation; the expected upload certificate was explicitly matched. Its reported expiry is 2054-02-02. APK v2 verification succeeded for this minSdk 24 application.
Git safety: android/key.properties and android/keystore/allflag-upload-key.jks remain ignored and untracked. A local in-memory check found no configured password values in either of the 2 indexed files or 84 Git-visible working files. The public example contains blank password fields. No credentials were printed, copied into reports or committed. Existing example staging was left unchanged. No upload was performed.
Local upload-signing verification is complete. Remaining manual work includes Play App Signing enrollment if prompted, creating the internal release and uploading the signed AAB, plus final signed-device testing. Store listing and policy tasks below remain unconfirmed.
The owner has approved com.allflag.allflag permanently for both applicationId and namespace, and confirmed Play Console app creation and Internal Testing tester configuration. Neither identity value was changed.
The owner created android/keystore/allflag-upload-key.jks and configured android/key.properties locally, then explicitly authorized Phase B. Both files exist, are ignored by Git, and are untracked. The agent did not generate the key or passwords. The commands below are setup reference only; do not regenerate the existing key.
Run these commands yourself in PowerShell from the project root. The installed JDK executable and its supported options were checked locally. Explicit JKS format avoids relying on the JDK default store format.
New-Item -ItemType Directory -Force android/keystore | Out-Null
& "C:\Program Files\Android\Android Studio\jbr\bin\keytool.exe" -genkeypair -v -storetype JKS -keystore "android/keystore/allflag-upload-key.jks" -alias allflag-upload -keyalg RSA -keysize 2048 -validity 10000
Enter passwords and certificate identity details at the interactive prompts. Pressing Enter at the key-password prompt reuses the store password; otherwise record the separate key password. Do not repeat generation if the key exists.
if (-not (Test-Path android/key.properties)) {
Copy-Item android/key.properties.example android/key.properties
}
notepad android/key.properties
Fill the blank passwords locally, preserving this structure:
storeFile=keystore/allflag-upload-key.jks
storePassword=<ENTER_LOCALLY>
keyAlias=allflag-upload
keyPassword=<ENTER_LOCALLY>
Never send passwords or file contents in chat. Relative paths resolve from android/, not android/app/. Java properties interpret backslash escapes: double any literal backslashes in passwords; do not wrap values in quote delimiters. Keep both passwords exactly consistent with those entered in keytool.
Back up the upload keystore and passwords securely outside the repository, using access-controlled encrypted storage and a password manager. Never commit them as a backup. Losing the upload key can require an upload-key reset with Google Play; it is separate from the final app signing key managed by Google. This workspace is under OneDrive; apply your intended private-key sync controls to the local keystore directory.
The Phase A stop was satisfied by the owner’s confirmation and Phase B authorization. No upload is authorized or performed.
Audit date: 2026-09-17. No artifacts were uploaded and no Play Console actions were performed. This is a release engineering audit, not a feature release.
| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| Application label | AllFlag |
| applicationId | com.allflag.allflag (permanent; owner approved) |
| namespace | com.allflag.allflag |
| versionName / versionCode | 0.1.2 / 3 |
| minSdk / targetSdk / compileSdk | 24 / 36 / 36 |
| Flutter / Dart | 3.47.2 stable / 3.13.2 |
| Android Gradle Plugin / Gradle | 9.1.0 / 9.3.1 |
| NDK | 28.2.13676358 |
SDK values come from the installed Flutter Gradle extension; no speculative SDK upgrade or hardcoded override was introduced. Recheck these values after any Flutter upgrade. The previous version was 0.1.1+2. The signing release increment uses pubspec.yaml; Gradle reads flutter.versionName and flutter.versionCode. Increment the build number for each new Play upload. Do not manually edit the generated android/local.properties version values.
The owner approved the existing package as permanent. No identity change was made. Package identity is effectively permanent once published.
Google’s target API policy was checked on the audit date: new phone apps and updates require API 36 or higher from August 31, 2026. AllFlag targets 36 and satisfies that requirement.
Flutter bundles native libraries. Follow Android’s 16 KB page-size guidance and validate the final signed artifact on a 16 KB device/emulator. The project already uses AGP newer than 8.5.1 and NDK r28; no toolchain upgrade was needed.
The main manifest requests no permissions. Debug/profile manifests request only android.permission.INTERNET for Flutter debugging and service communication; these variants are not merged into release. No networking permission was added. The PROCESS_TEXT queries entry is package visibility metadata, not a permission.
The merged release manifest adds exactly one requested permission: com.allflag.allflag.DYNAMIC_RECEIVER_NOT_EXPORTED_PERMISSION, defined with signature protection by androidx.core:core:1.13.1. It protects internal dynamic receivers and is retained. There are no requested Android platform permissions. The profile installer receiver is protected by android.permission.DUMP; that attribute restricts its callers and does not request DUMP for AllFlag.
No screenOrientation lock is declared. The existing orientation configChanges handling, Flutter MediaQuery switch, BoxFit.contain, black background, and immersiveSticky request are unchanged. Android can still impose system-bar behavior. The owner confirmed v0.1 physical Android validation; this does not substitute for installing the final signed v0.1.2 release.
The initial template signed release with the debug key. That fallback has been removed. In v0.1.2, release tasks fail clearly without android/key.properties. There is no unsigned-release fallback. Debug development can continue without the private file. The upload keystore was created privately by the owner.
With a complete key.properties file, Gradle uses the release signing config. An incomplete file or missing keystore fails configuration instead of falling back to debug signing. Final Phase B verified both signed artifacts against the expected upload certificate; see the successful result above.
Human setup, when ready:
Never commit keystores (.jks/.keystore/.p12/.pfx), real key.properties, passwords, private keys, service-account credentials or Play credentials. Existing Android ignore rules and repository-wide keystore/key.properties rules cover the common signing files. Alternate filenames still require explicit ignore rules. The tracked example contains only blank fields and instructions.
From the project root, with the audited Flutter and Android SDK installed:
flutter clean
flutter pub get
dart format .
flutter analyze
flutter test
flutter build apk --release
flutter build appbundle --release
Stop and resolve any failing command before considering a release ready. Expected APK: build/app/outputs/flutter-apk/app-release.apk. Expected AAB: build/app/outputs/bundle/release/app-release.aab. Run these commands in Phase B only after the private signing file is configured. Never upload an unsigned audit build left over from v0.1.1.
With app creation and identity confirmed, configure Play App Signing, supply an upload key and rebuild. Prepare the listing, contact details, icon, feature graphic, screenshots, target audience, ads declaration (no ads), app access declaration (no restricted access) and content rating questionnaire.
The current app has no analytics, accounts, networking, or third-party runtime plugins. Review that behavior when completing Data Safety; the form has not been submitted. Google’s User Data policy requires a public privacy policy and in-app access even when no personal data is collected. Prepare truthful owner/contact details, host the policy and add its in-app access in a separately scoped change; no UI feature was added here.
After signed-artifact checks, use the configured internal testers and prepare release notes and create an internal testing release when authorized. Internal testing is not production access. For newer personal accounts, Google’s testing requirements include a closed test with at least 12 continuously opted-in testers for 14 days before applying for production access. Account type/date and account-specific requirements have not been checked. Do not mark any Console task complete based solely on this repository audit.
These are previous unsigned-build results, not v0.1.2 signing validation.
Inspection commands (substitute your Android SDK and JDK paths):
aapt dump badging build/app/outputs/flutter-apk/app-release.apk
zipalign -c -P 16 4 build/app/outputs/flutter-apk/app-release.apk
apksigner verify --verbose build/app/outputs/flutter-apk/app-release.apk
jarsigner -verify build/app/outputs/bundle/release/app-release.aab
Get-Item build/app/outputs/bundle/release/app-release.aab
Signing verification must succeed for the final signed release. The audit failure above is not a successful signing check.
Google Play Console → Internal Testing → Create new release → configure/accept Play App Signing if prompted → upload the signed AAB.
The agent will not perform the upload. Play App Signing enrollment and the internal testing release have not been confirmed complete.
Version is now 0.1.2+3. Application ID and namespace remain com.allflag.allflag. No app behavior, dependencies or private credentials were changed.
Do not regenerate or overwrite the keystore. Test it interactively from the project root using the password originally entered during key creation:
& "C:\Program Files\Android\Android Studio\jbr\bin\keytool.exe" -list -keystore "android/keystore/allflag-upload-key.jks" -alias allflag-upload -storetype JKS
This prompts locally; do not supply password arguments or send passwords in chat. If it opens, correct storePassword in android/key.properties privately. Confirm keyPassword matches the key password used during creation, often the same as the store password. Java properties process backslash escapes: double literal backslashes, avoid quote delimiters and unintended trailing spaces.
If keytool also fails with the original password, verify the intended keystore and secure backup. The message alone cannot distinguish a wrong password from corruption. Confirm corrected local configuration before retrying Phase B. Signature verification, public certificate comparison, Play App Signing setup, the internal release and signed-device testing remain pending.
The owner confirmed keytool can open the keystore, alias allflag-upload is a PrivateKeyEntry, and supplied this public certificate SHA-256:
9F:61:1A:BA:E6:AC:37:EF:F0:E4:A3:73:2F:7E:E7:90:8B:75:5C:45:2D:6D:9D:AE:71:BC:74:15:89:74:36:23
This is a human-verified reference, not a fingerprint verified from a generated artifact. The subsequent clean retry again passed formatting, analysis and all 7 tests, but both APK and AAB signing failed with the same password/integrity error (packageRelease and signReleaseBundle respectively). Neither expected final artifact exists, so no artifact size or verified signature is available. Private configuration and keystore contents were not inspected during this retry; only Gradle used them for the authorized signing attempt. No passwords were scanned or read by a diagnostic helper in this retry.
Because interactive keytool succeeds, reconcile the password entered there with the value Java Properties supplies to Gradle. Check locally for literal quotes, unintended trailing spaces, duplicate property assignments, and unescaped backslashes. In Java properties, dollar signs need no special escaping; literal backslashes do. Do not paste credentials into shell commands or chat, and do not regenerate the key. The file must be saved at android/key.properties.
The original Gradle loader used Properties.load(InputStream), which decodes ISO-8859-1. The private file is valid UTF-8, and this decoding difference changed the store-password value. The loader now explicitly decodes strict UTF-8, rejects malformed input, removes only an optional leading file BOM and calls Properties.load(Reader). It preserves password whitespace and standard property escapes; it does not trim, normalize or guess passwords. Save the file as UTF-8.
Structural inspection found one occurrence of each required key, no BOM, no surrounding whitespace, quote delimiters or backslash escapes. The storeFile resolves to the intended android/keystore/allflag-upload-key.jks. Alias and key-password parsing are unchanged between the old and new loaders.
The corrected Gradle script compiles, but flutter build appbundle –release still fails at signReleaseBundle with the store password/integrity error. An independent JDK check using the same UTF-8 Properties semantics also fails store authentication, so the remaining failure is not specific to Gradle.
A separate read-only JKS diagnostic loaded the certificate and encrypted key entry without performing the store-integrity check, then successfully unlocked the private-key entry with the configured keyPassword. The public certificate matches the expected SHA-256 above. This isolates the remaining mismatch to the configured storePassword. It does not establish successful store integrity or an artifact signature, and integrity validation was NOT bypassed in Gradle.
The human-verified interactive store password must be reconciled locally with the UTF-8 storePassword value saved in key.properties. No private values were printed, no credentials or JKS were modified, and no upload occurred. APK/AAB signature verification remains blocked. The APK build is not repeated after this AAB failure because the requested success prerequisite was not met.
After the loader fix, flutter analyze reports no issues and flutter test passes all 7 tests. Git exclusions remain effective and neither private file is tracked. Neither final APK nor AAB exists at its expected output path.
The owner reported re-entering storePassword and authorized an AAB-first retry. flutter build appbundle –release still failed at signReleaseBundle with the same keystore password/integrity error. Credentials and keystore contents were not read or modified during this retry. Both private files remain ignored and untracked. Because AAB success was the prerequisite, the APK build, artifact signature checks, analysis and tests were not repeated in this retry. The latest completed analysis and 7-test run above remain passing; signing is still blocked.